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Memory and identity in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: links with the conceptions of cognitive neuroscience |
Revue de neuropsychologie. Volume 2, Number 2, 157-70, juin 2010, Article de synthèse
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 Résumé
Texte intégral
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Author(s) : Marie-Loup Eustache |
Summary : Husserl distinguishes long-term memory or “recollection” from short-term memory, a phenomenon he calls “retention”. The attempt to define the very essence of retention leads Husserl, through its particular philosophical method known as phenomenology, to this invariant absolute consciousness present in all consciousness. Retention does not seem to be a moment just past, kept in memory so that there is a complete seizure of an object captured in time, but a way of constituting the given conscience. Retention is in fact part of the absolute consciousness and is what allows consciousness to be conscious of something without knowing it consciously builds up the meaning of the object of thought it is collecting in consciousness. Retention is the constitutive phenomenon allowing me to be both aware and understand how I am aware. Husserl sees in me two intentionalities of consciousness, permitted by retention: retention is the point of intersection between short-term memory and identity, between a being that is thinking and a being that lives. |
Keywords : retention, recollection, consciousness, intimate time, perception of perception, absolute consciousness, identity |
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